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National Security Without Secret Laws: How Other Nations Balance National
Security Interests and Transparency of the Law
By Sudha Setty*
One of the hallmarks of a democratic nation is that there are no secret laws.1 Yet parts of
the George W. Bush administration‘s legal policy that governed aspects of the war on terror were
laid out in non-public opinions issued the Department of Justice‘s Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC). Many of those opinions, which are almost always binding on the executive branch and
are used to provide legal comfort to government officials in the form of protection against future
investigation or prosecution, are still secret or were kept secret for years before being leaked or
disseminated to Congress and the public.
Numerous scholars and politicians called for the disclosure of these OLC opinions,2 and
others similarly argued that secrecy in the development and implementation of legal policy runs
afoul of the rule of law, compromises the quality of the OLC‘s legal opinions, and undermines
confidence in the integrity of executive branch constitutional interpretation. The Bush
administration claimed that greater disclosure would have jeopardized U.S. national security
interests—a claim that is undermined by the experiences of other nations that have been able to
both deal with national security concerns and maintain a greater level of transparency. This
Issue Brief buttresses the calls for timely and structured disclosure of OLC opinions (on which
the administration actually relies upon in executing its legal policy) by considering how other
nations that face severe national security threats maintain greater transparency and public
accessibility for legal policy related to national security matters.
Part I of this Issue Brief provides a short overview of the problems inherent in the
politicization of OLC. Part II describes some of the Bush administration justifications for nondisclosure of OLC memoranda and addresses the concerns underlying the justifications. Part III
uses the comparative examples of India, Israel, and the United Kingdom to illustrate how other
nations facing serious national security challenges have opted for a significantly more
transparent model of developing and implementing legal policy related to national security
issues. Part IV examines whether the case for OLC reform can still be made given the Obama
administration‘s disclosure of numerous Bush-era OLC opinions. This Issue Brief concludes by
urging serious consideration of structural reform to ensure objectivity, transparency, and political
accountability at OLC from administration to administration.

*

Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. J.D. Columbia Law School, A.B.
Stanford University. Sudha Setty © 2009. This Issue Brief draws from a full-length law review article analyzing
the same issues: Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t
Let the Terrorists Win, 57 KANSAS L. REV. 579 (2009).
1
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969).
2
See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Dawn Johnsen, et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (2004), reprinted
in 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1559, app. 2.

1

I.

The Politicization of the Office of Legal Counsel

One of the fundamental responsibilities of the U.S. Attorney General and his or her
subordinates in the OLC is to provide legal advice and counsel to the administration.3 As the
chief legal officer of the United States, the Attorney General has an obligation to uphold the rule
of law by providing the best possible legal counsel to the President and administration and to
limit the effect of political pressures to mold his or her opinion to facilitate the political goals of
the President.4 The importance of adhering to the rule of law is compounded when the legal
opinions offered by the Attorney General are used as legal comfort: protecting government
actors from future liability and criminal prosecution while conducting work on behalf of the
administration.5
However, numerous obstacles exist to the OLC offering its most impartial, and arguably
best, assessment of the law, including the inherent conflicts of interest which arise when the
administration attempts to influence the OLC to issue opinions that are politically advantageous
to the administration. Historically, this political pressure has been brought to bear during times
of war or armed conflict, raising doubts as to whether any administration can achieve the ―best
practice‖ of offering non-politicized legal advice at all times.6
During the seven years of the Bush administration after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, the OLC became highly politicized and drafted numerous memoranda and legal opinions
which engendered criticism on two fronts: first, the substance of the policies promulgated,7 and
second, the process by which the OLC developed and implemented its legal policy.8 Key
memoranda which strongly influenced the administration‘s prosecution of the war on terror
included an extraordinarily narrow definition of ―torture‖ as applied to detainees9 and the
provision of legal comfort to those interrogators who violated federal and international law.10
3

NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S OFFICE, 1789-1990
1-2 (Univ. Press of Kansas 1992). See Dawn Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
Executive Power, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2007) (noting that the opinions generated by the Office of Legal
Counself (OLC) are generally considered binding on the executive branch, unless the President or Attorney General
disagrees based on a differing legal interpretation).
4
Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT‘L SECURITY L. & POL‘Y 455,
464-66 (2005) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003)) (arguing that the appropriate ethical
standard for legal advice rendered by OLC lawyers is such that ―the lawyer‘s role is not simply to spin out creative
legal arguments. It is to offer her assessment of the law as objectively as possible.‖).
5
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 23, 96
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2007) (noting that it is ―practically impossible to prosecute someone who relied in good faith
on an [OLC] opinion, even if the opinion turns out to be wrong‖).
6
See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 2, at 1603 (calling for the OLC to maintain a non-politicized stance in developing
legal policy).
7
See e.g., Editorial, The Torturers’ Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at WK9 (criticizing recently disclosed
OLC memoranda in which legal comfort was offered to interrogators using techniques on detainees such as
waterboarding, sleep deprivation, slamming into a wall and locking in a box with insects).
8
See generally Johnsen, supra note 3; Goldsmith, supra note 5; Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1250–58 (2006) (noting the executive branch‘s use of constitutional
avoidance theory to assert its right to circumvent the parameters of FISA); H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and
the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313 (2006).
9
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee
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Not only did these memoranda stake new legal ground for the administration, but their
effect was compounded by unprecedented secrecy within the Department of Justice and
administration as a whole, and to other branches of government and the public.11 The
nondisclosure of legal opinions and the opacity of the OLC created an environment in which
other changes could be effected without outside oversight, including political influence on
content and conclusions of the legal opinions drafted by the OLC.12 The lack of information
disclosure led to the breakdown of other norms, such as appropriate supervision within the
OLC13 and the use of external checks, including consultation with the general counsels for
relevant administrative departments, in developing legal policy.
II.

Bush Administration Justifications for Nondisclosure

National security interests demand a heightened awareness of how sensitive information
is treated, since the President has legitimate needs to act quickly and discreetly in times of war.
Equally legitimate, however, is the need for the public and Congress to understand the country‘s
legal policy vis-à-vis national security matters. The Bush administration justified its
nondisclosure of legal policy by insisting, among other arguments, that nondisclosure of legal
policy is necessary to maintain the integrity of U.S. national security interests.14 The Bush
administration often offered the defense that additional information about the content of OLC
opinions would empower terrorists planning to attack the U.S.15 Former Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales testified that ―widespread briefings would pose an unacceptable risk to the
national security.‖16
Memorandum]. The Bybee Memorandum was superseded, in part, by another memorandum, drafted by the acting
head of OLC Daniel Levin, that addressed the applicability of the Convention Against Torture and disavowed some
of the conclusions made in the Bybee Memorandum. See Memorandum to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
Legal Standards Applicable Under U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum].
10
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t
of Def., Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003)
[hereinafterYoo Memorandum].
11
See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 3(2008)
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing](statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) (noting the
practices of the Justice Department leading it to be a ―department of cloaking misguided policies under veiled
secrecy, leaving Congress, the courts, but especially the American people in the dark.‖).
12
Oversight Hearing, supra note 11, at 72 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.) (―I‘m
worried we‘re not getting enough clarity on critical issues. We have heard reference to legal opinions, to
justifications, facts that remain hidden from the Congress, the American people. And it‘s a hallmark of our
democracy that we say what our laws are and what conduct they prohibit. We‘ve seen what‘s happened when
hidden decisions are made in secret memos and that‘s held from the American people, held from their
representatives here in Congress. It erodes our liberties, but in undermines our values as a nation of laws.‖).
13
Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 167.
14
See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 1565; Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Prepared Statement (Feb.
6, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/020606gonzales.html (last visited March 3, 2008).
15
Carol D. Leonig & Eric Kich, U.S. Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2006, at A1. See Heidi
Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1049, 1056 (2008) (―the administration has offered no explanation of the purported dangers of revealing the
program‘s very existence beyond the vague assertion that, while terrorists surely already know that the United States
can survey their conversation, knowing about the program would remind them of this fact and might lead them to
infer that surveillance is broader than they had assumed‖).
16
Wartime Executive Power and National Security Administration’s Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 136 (2006), available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2006-hr/nsasurv.pdf, at
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The Bush administration Department of Justice used the fact that national security was its
top priority to support extensive nondisclosure. For example, a March 2003 memorandum
authored by Office of Legal Counsel attorney John Yoo provided legal comfort to interrogators
of detainees captured during the war on terror.17 This memorandum sought to insulate U.S.
government officials from prosecution or other legal liability if they used coercive interrogation
techniques such as waterboarding, head-slapping, and exposure of prisoners to extreme
temperatures.18 The existence of this memorandum was known outside of the Bush
administration for several years, but the administration refused requests to disclose the
memorandum—based on purported national security concerns associated with the release of the
opinion.19 The memorandum had been classified to prevent disclosure, but was declassified and
disclosed in April 2008 in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.20 It is unclear what
legitimate basis existed for the memorandum to be withheld from public scrutiny, since it
contained neither sensitive personal information nor details about specific intelligence-gathering
programs.
The Bush administration‘s other proffered justification for nondisclosure turned on a
unilateralist reading of the unitary executive theory, which held that the President alone has the
authority to decide how the administration will fulfill its constitutional obligations.21 The Bush
administration relied on textual arguments such as the Commander-in-Chief clause and the
Vesting Clause of the Constitution to claim unilateral jurisdiction over war-related decision
making.22 This approach discounted the fact that the framers of the Constitution and early
administrations emphasized pragmatic power-sharing between Congress and the President,
particularly with regard to the actions of the Attorney General, an office adopted from British
and state colonial governments whose original goal was to provide counsel for both the President
and Congress.23 This approach also inappropriately set aside Congress‘s constitutionally granted
war powers, including Congress‘s right to regulate captures during war and to conduct oversight
of the President even in matters of national security.24
The claim that disclosure of legal policies is unnecessary and unwise because it would
jeopardize U.S. national security interests is questionable, given both the experiences of the U.S.
and other nations, as well as serious concerns about the maintenance of the rule of law. First, the
Bush administration offered no credible evidence that disclosure will harm or has harmed U.S.
national security interests; in fact, it offered no evidence that the disclosure of the OLC
137. See id. at 19, 41, 76-77, 80, 83, 130-131, 138 for further pragmatic arguments in favor of non-disclosure of
national security-related legal policy to Congress.
17
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep‘t
of Def. 8 n. 10 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Yoo Memorandum].
18
Id.
19
Dan Eggen & Josh White, Memo: Laws Didn’t Apply to Interrogators, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1.
20
Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Secret Bush Administration Torture Memo Released Today in
Response to ACLU Lawsuit (Apr. 1, 2008).
21
See, e.g., Yoo memorandum, supra note 17; see also James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16 2005, at A1.
22
See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of the War Powers,
84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996).
23
Baker, supra note 3, at 37-38.
24
U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2 (implied right to oversight); id. at § 8, cl. 11 (wartime captures).
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memoranda that were initially withheld from public scrutiny negatively impacted U.S. national
security programs. Repeated claims of a need for secrecy based on national security concerns
ultimately undermined the Bush administration‘s claim, with more evidence pointing to secrecy
being maintained primarily for political purposes.25 Further, the Bush administration failed to
make its case as to why legal policies governing the war on terror must be afforded more secrecy
than domestic criminal laws and procedural rules. If the U.S. or any democratic nation chooses
to rely on secret laws and thus deviate so substantially from the general edicts of the rule of law,
the public deserves a credible and clear explanation as to why that deviation is necessary.
III.

Transparency of Legal Policy in Other Nations

The claim that national security threats require secret law and an unprecedented lack of
transparency is undermined by comparison with other nations. Other countries that face serious
national security issues have no mechanism or allowance for secret legal policies to govern
national security matters; instead, several nations publicize, disseminate and publicly debate the
same type of legal policy that was withheld from public scrutiny by the OLC during the Bush
administration. A comparative perspective, even of nations with significant different
governmental structures, provides some context to evaluate the U.S. administration‘s pragmatic
justification for non-disclosure.26
A.

India

India has been coping with serious national security concerns, both internal and external,
for the last 60 years.27 By some accounts, India is the nation that has faced the highest number
of terrorist acts in recent years.28 The similarities with the U.S. national security landscape are
noteworthy. The central government of India has responsibility for developing laws and policies
to preserve the national security of India,29 and the country goes through periods of conflict in
which its otherwise supposedly impartial and unbiased legal policy becomes politicized and
prone to government overreaching in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties.30 In the last nine
years, both India and the U.S. have experienced a period of intense focus on national security in
the wake of significant terrorist attacks. India passed a number of strong antiterrorism laws in
recent years which grant additional authority and power to the central government to maintain
national security. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and attacks on Indian
government buildings soon afterward,31 the Indian Parliament enacted the Prevention of
25

Editorial, Politics, Pure and Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22.
Kim Lane Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/11 Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 609 (2006) (noting the value of
considering other countries‘ experiences with balancing national security with other constitutional interests).
27
See Anil Kalhan, et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L., Fall 2006, at 1, 99.
28
E.g., Arun Venugopal, India Worst Hit by Terrorism in 2004, INDIA ABROAD, Aug. 19, 2005, at A14.
29
INDIA CONST., art. 246, List I, §§ 1-2, 2A; id. at List III, §§ 1-2.
30
For example, the Defence of India Act of 1962 authorized the central and state governments to broaden their use
of preventative detention beyond ordinary laws as a means to quell potential uprisings against the government and in
response to hostilities in the Jammu and Kashmir region. See Kalhan, supra note 27, at 132-33 (citing VENKAT
IYER, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 109 (2000)).
31
The Indian parliament building in New Delhi was attacked in December 2001, with 12 people killed and 22
injured in an exchange of gunfire. See 2001: Suicide Attack on Indian Parliament, BBC NEWS, available at
26
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Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA). Under POTA, the government, in conducting antiterrorist
activities and in case of a self-determined emergency, was authorized to set aside ordinary legal
protections with regard to wiretapping any person within India without authorization, extend the
duration and scope of preventative detention measures, and deny arrested suspects access to
counsel.32 Some antiterrorist activities legally authorized under POTA parallel what was initially
authorized under the USA Patriot Act, particularly in terms of allowing for enhanced
surveillance of citizens and increasing authority for other intelligence-gathering efforts.33
The responsibility for the creation of legal policy in India is diffuse, with the parliament
having the ultimate ability to set the law, while the prime minister and administrative
departments play central, but not decisive, roles. In addition, certain critical issues can be
referred to external committees and commissions. For example, an early iteration of some of the
POTA policies was a 2000 report34 drafted by the Indian Law Commission,35 a nonpartisan
commission of respected lawyers and jurists who respond to government requests for legal
recommendations. This referral reflects the fact that the executive branch viewed the task of
drafting legal policies for at least some national security issues to warrant thoughtful and
apolitical analysis to structure and recommend long-term responses to threats of terrorism. The
2000 report contained recommendations that the parliament strengthen the central government‘s
power to conduct antiterrorism operations, primarily in light of ongoing domestic unrest that
could provoke a national crisis. Even at this early stage, transparency and public opportunity for
comment were considered. The Law Commission, in accordance with its own policies,
circulated the report to the public through its website and distributed the report to government
officials for review and comments.36
POTA‘s enactment (and eventual repeal) illustrates the important role that transparency
can play in permitting political accountability. After the September 11 terrorist attacks in the
U.S., the Indian parliament began debate on whether to pass the Law Commission‘s
recommendations from the 2000 report into law. In the meantime, because of the perceived
immediacy of the need for the intelligence-gathering tools outlined in the Law Commission‘s
report, the executive branch issued the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 2001, a temporary
ordinance which put into place the recommended tools. POTA was enacted in March, 2002,37
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/3695057.stm (last visited June 6,
2008).
32
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002, at §§ 43, 45, 49, 52.
33
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56,115 Stat. 272, at tit. II, § 218, tit. IX, § 901.
34
Indian Law Commission, 173rd report (April 2000).
35
The Law Commission is a non-partisan group of lawyers and judges commissioned by the central government to
offer advice and proposals for legal reform. See Indian Law Commission, How Does the Commission Function?,
available at http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/main.htm#HOW_DOES_THE_COMMISSION_FUNCTION?
(last visited May 5, 2008).
36
Id. (noting that the proposed reform is ―sent out for circulation in the public and concerned interest groups with a
view to eliciting reactions and suggestions. Usually a carefully prepared questionnaire is also sent with the
document. The Law Commission has been anxious to ensure that the widest section of people [is] consulted in
formulating proposals for law reforms. In this process, partnerships are established with professional bodies and
academic institutions. Seminars and workshops are organised in different parts of the country to elicit critical
opinion on proposed strategies for reform‖).
37
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (enacted March 28, 2002).
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but was met with a great deal of opposition from human rights advocates and opposing political
parties.38 In response, the Home Minister of India claimed that opponents to the measure were
assisting the terrorists,39 rhetoric that mirrors the public discourse within the United States in
response to the Patriot Act, as well as the legal policy developed by the U.S. executive branch at
that time. POTA became a driving issue in the 2004 parliamentary election. The Congress
Party, then a minority political party, ran on the promise to repeal POTA because of the law‘s
enabling of abuses of human rights and civil liberties.40 When the Congress Party won the 2004
parliamentary elections, POTA was repealed almost immediately.41
No secret law exists in terms of Indian antiterrorism policies; instead, they are generated
with a significant level of publicity and public accountability.42 This publicity led to public and
parliamentary support for POTA in 2002; that same publicity and public accounting led to the
repeal of the Act in 2004. Whatever the content of anti-terror policies, the process of Indian
policy-making demonstrates the ability to define the scope of—and legal comfort offered by—
national security policy without undue secrecy.43
B.

Israel

Israel has dealt with serious national security issues since its founding in 1948, with
scores of people dying each year in various types of attacks, including suicide bombings, car
bombs, and kidnappings.44 Israel‘s antiterrorism efforts, including the techniques used by
Israel‘s General Security Service in interrogating detainees suspected of terrorist activities, are
authorized broadly by Article 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Statute and the government‘s
general and residual powers under Article 40 of the Basic Law (Government).
The legal treatment of specific interrogation techniques used by the General Security
Services is fundamentally different from how OLC memoranda treat the same issue. The
authority of the General Security Service to employ certain interrogation techniques was

38

C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Implications of National Security Laws in India: Combating Terrorism While
Preserving Civil Liberties, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL‘Y 195, 196 (2005).
39
Kalhan, supra note 27, at 152.
40
Id. at 152, 190.
41
Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 2004. In response to the November 2008
terrorist attack in Mumbai that killed over 150 people and the public outrage that followed, many provisions of
POTA were reintroduced in proposed legislation. See Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2008;
National Investigation Agency Bill, 2008. See also Somini Sengupta, Dossier Gives Details of Mumbai Attacks,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2009, at A5 (describing November 2008 attacks in Mumbai).
42
See also Right to Information Act, 2005 (containing provisions similar to FOIA, including an exemption for a
deliberative privilege, but not for adopted policies).
43
Although a number of acts of terrorism have occurred in India in the last several years, no credible argument has
been made that the publication of India‘s legal policies surrounding national security is one of the bases for attacks
occurring.
44
H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Government of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, at ¶ 1 (1999) (―The
State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for both its very existence and security, from the day of its
founding‖); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1919 (2004).
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examined by the Israeli Commission of Inquiry,45 which concluded in 1995 that the General
Security Service had the authority to interrogate suspects using certain physical techniques, and
established the availability of a post factum defense of ―necessity‖ for interrogators who engaged
in what would otherwise be considered criminal actions.46
The General Security Service interpreted the necessity defense broadly; like various OLC
memoranda, the necessity defense was interpreted internally such that interrogators were given
broad legal comfort that they could not be prosecuted for torturing terrorism suspects so long as
they were doing so in an effort to preserve national security.47 But unlike the similar Office of
Legal Counsel memoranda, this interpretation of the necessity defense was not kept secret from
the public, courts, or detainees themselves.48
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, human rights
groups and individual detainees challenged the blanket reading of the necessity defense based on
rule of law and human rights concerns. The court, with some reservations given Israel‘s national
security issues, unanimously held that broad legal comfort to protect interrogators who torture
suspects was unacceptable under Israeli Basic Law.49 The court struggled with several national
priorities:
―[w]e are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with that
harsh reality [of Israel‘s security issues]. This is the destiny of
democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all
practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a
democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it
nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and
recognition of an individual‘s liberty constitutes an important
component in its understanding of security.‖50
The High Court, however, affirmed the availability of a necessity defense for individual
interrogators being prosecuted for using such techniques during a perceived national security
emergency, but rejected the argument put forth by the Israeli government, which parallels the
arguments set forth in various Office of Legal Counsel memoranda, that blanket immunity ought
to apply to the interrogators‘ actions.51
45

The Commission of Inquiry, which undertakes investigations of government actions, was convened under the
authority of the Commission of Inquiry Statute in 1968.
46
The techniques at issue included harsh shaking which, in one instance, led to the death of the detainee; prolonged
detention in stress positions; exposure to extreme temperatures; and covering the detainee‘s head with a vomitcovered hood. H.C. 5100/94 at ¶¶ 2, 8-13, 15, 19.
47
Id. at ¶¶ 8, 15-17 .
48
Id. at ¶¶ 8 (―The decision to utilize physical means [in interrogation]…is based on internal regulations, which
requires obtaining permission from various ranks of the [Security Services] hierarchy. The regulations themselves
were approved by a special Ministerial Committee…[t]he Committee set forth directives pertaining to the rank
authorized to allow these interrogation practices); ¶17 (―The [Security Services‘] authority to employ particular
interrogation methods, and the relevant law respecting these matters were examined by the Commission of Inquiry
(whose report was published, as mentioned, in the Landau Book)‖).
49
Id. at ¶¶ 38-40 .
50
Id. at ¶ 39.
51
Id. at ¶ 38.
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The Public Committee Against Torture decision illustrates how Israel navigated the
tension between adhering to the rule of law and maximizing national security efforts, particularly
with respect to making public the legal policies and parameters under which the General Security
Service interrogators were acting.
C.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) has dealt with significant internal and external threats to
national security for many decades. A central influence on the development of the UK‘s modern
national security regime was the violent conflicts, known as ―The Troubles,‖ in Northern Ireland,
which escalated in the late 1960s and were largely resolved only in 1998, with the signing of the
Belfast Agreement.52 During The Troubles, almost 3,000 people were killed and over 30,000
were seriously injured.53 More recently, the UK has been confronted with international terrorist
threats, including an attack on the London mass transit system in July 2005 which killed 56
people, including the attackers, and injured over 700 others.54
UK law has vacillated in terms of trying to maintain a balance among the interests of
national security, civil rights and liberties, and the rule of law. Complicating matters is that the
UK is under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and that detainees
have the right to appeal domestic legislation and judicial decisions to the ECHR.55
As in India, Israel, and the United States, the British Prime Minister is endowed with
war-making power as a legacy of a historical Crown prerogative; nevertheless, he or she almost
always seeks authorization of the Parliament to act.56 Additionally, UK law and constitutional
norms require that emergency powers be exercised in a legal framework involving the
Parliament and the courts,57 a striking contrast to the Bush administration‘s vision of wartime
decision-making as solely within the purview of the President.
The mandatory involvement of the legislature and nature of British parliamentary
supremacy has ensured that executive branch legal policy does not unilaterally determine how
national security interests are going to be balanced with constitutional constraints. The role of
the legislative body also ensures that debate and passage (as widely publicized and generally
televised) face public scrutiny and the political accountability that such scrutiny allows. The role
of Parliament has forced the Prime Minister to pass legislation in order to deal with particular
situations in the war on terror; for example, in November 2005 former Prime Minister Tony Blair
52

Belfast Agreement, Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, available at
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm#support (last visited June 10, 2008).
53
Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 1933.
54
House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 2006H.C.
1087, at 2.
55
Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 1943.
56
Matthew Tempest, Government Kills Short’s War Bill, GUARDIAN, Oct. 21, 2005 (London),
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956, 1597883,00.html.
57
Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480, 2499 (2006)
(addressing the cooperation among the Prime Minister, Parliament and the judicial system in dealing with the
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was unable to pass legislation that would allow the government to detain terrorism suspects for
up to 90 days without being charged because the House of Commons, led by Blair‘s own Labour
Party, voted down the proposed legislation.58
Further, since the United Kingdom‘s acceptance of the jurisdiction of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR), the judicial check on executive exercise of national security powers is
a robust one: domestic judicial review is available for all national security-related legal policy,
even in times of war, including challenges to the treatment of individual detainees. The 2004
decision of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department59 illustrated that British courts will
act decisively to counteract national security laws—in that case, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act, 2001 Part IV—if they deem it to be disproportionate and discriminatory under
ECHR standards.60
Finally, U.K. accountability on national security law and policy is bolstered by a series of
independent reviews authorized by the House of Commons in which a member of the House of
Lords was granted the necessary security clearance and a mandate to make independent reports
on the operation of the Terrorism Act, 2000 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005.61 Those
reports were published to Parliament and the public in 200862 and 2007,63 respectively.
IV.

Is There Still a Need for Reform?

Given that the Obama administration appears committed to greater transparency and
assuming internal constraints can be re-established to maintain impartiality and best practices, is
it still necessary to advocate for Office of Legal Counsel reform?64 In order to establish longterm process protections for the rule of law, I assert that external structural constraints,
particularly transparency requirements, continue to be necessary. This is particularly true when
both houses of Congress and the President belong to the same political party—if Congress does
not have the political will to exercise oversight of the OLC during any given administration,
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mandated disclosure can and will serve as a backstop.65 Further, politicization and political
pressure may be inevitable in times of war. Politicization that leads to self-interested actions,
such as keeping secret potentially controversial legal policies, highlights the need for
institutionalized checks and balances such as mandated disclosure.
Instituting an internal model of best practices at OLC might not suffice, since asking
OLC lawyers to adhere to a particular model of best practices may be futile if those lawyers
already believe that they are adhering to best practices with regard to their legal analysis.66
Various Justice Department officials from the Bush administration made clear that they believe
that the legal opinions drafted by the OLC were done so in good faith and through the best
possible interpretation of the law.67 Jack Goldsmith, former head of the OLC and a strong critic
of some tactics of the Bush administration, stated that everyone he dealt with in the Bush
administration ―thought they were doing the right thing‖ in developing OLC legal opinions.68
The belief that a different set of principles will once again prevail in the OLC and the
administration, without further measures to ensure greater information disclosure, inherently
assumes that the breakdown of previous OLC norms is peculiar to one administration and will
not recur in the future.69
The question that remains after all of the hand-wringing over the Bush administration
politicization of the OLC is whether President Obama and every future president will be
successful in re-establishing OLC objectivity and best practices, in which case the information
disclosure problems highlighted here may not need to be addressed further. However, future
presidents may find it helpful and self-serving to use the Bush administration as precedent to
65
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cement the aggregation of executive power70 and limit access to Office of Legal Counsel legal
policy whenever it becomes expedient to do so, in which case we must consider whether
additional structural or institutional measures will be helpful to improve the quality of Office of
Legal Counsel opinions while maintaining the integrity of sensitive national security programs to
which some legal opinions relate. As one Bush administration critic put it, ―What was once
shocking and unacceptable in America has now been internalized as the new normal.‖71
V.

Conclusion

This Issue Brief does not prescribe a single solution to the problem of ensuring
objectivity, transparency, and political accountability in OLC opinions. However, I argue that, at
the very least, we should discard the notion that transparency in the law is impossible for a nation
facing serious national security concerns. A look at just a small sampling of nations—India,
Israel, and the U.K.—that face threats of terrorism shows that secret law is not necessary.
Of course, questions might be raised about the overall effectiveness of the national
security policies in India, Israel, and the United Kingdom compared to the United States, and
there is always the possibility that, despite our understanding that nations are adhering to the rule
of law (through court decisions, governmental statements, and legislative oversight), a nation is
actually secretly developing contrary national security policies. However, if such secret policy
exists in these other countries, there is no indication that those policies would provide legal
comfort against future prosecution. Further, although the models of developing national security
legal policy in other nations do not have direct applicability to US policy, in grappling with how
to balance transparency and national security concerns, the US can and should look beyond its
borders to examine how other nations have fashioned solutions.
The politicization of the OLC during the Bush administration, when combined with the
predictable self-interest of any administration in not voluntarily disclosing its own legal policies,
suggests that structural change should be considered to ensure greater long-term transparency
and adherence to the rule of law. Broad structural change would permit the objectivity,
integrity, and transparency of OLC opinions to be vouchsafed from administration to
administration. Such change is necessary to restore the rule of law and the standing of the U.S.
as a nation that is a standard bearer for democratic principles.72 Eliminating the existence of
secret laws which provide legal comfort and restoring the democratic principles of the
application of law are two important means of doing so, and the experiences of other countries
should suggest to us that making such changes are possible.
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